What does Trump's embrace of multipolarity mean for Modi & India?
Is India one of the poles?
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, DC earlier this month, where he became the fourth world leader to meet US President Donald Trump upon his return to the White House, inspired two broad categories of analysis:
Modi pulled off “magic” by disarming Trump and setting an “expansive agenda” for Indo-US relations, against a backdrop in which the American president has been taking aim at his country’s partners.
Modi helped India dodge a bullet by kowtowing quickly in DC, even if the actual outcomes of the meeting are little more than “cute acronyms.”
A third one is emerging a bit more quietly, even if it fits in quite easily with the longer history of New Delhi’s fears about American power.
Modi’s foreign policy doctrine, as articulated by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, is built on a preference for “plurilateralism” and a “multi-polar” world. Jaishankar has spent much of the time since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bristling at Western media questions about New Delhi’s ties with Moscow. (Do see his ‘brutal’ and ‘savage’ responses, and the fanfare directed at him for, uh, putting on shades).
The Indian government was deeply uncomfortable with former US President Joe Biden’s (wildly inconsistent) ‘democracies vs autocracies’ reading of the world, and complained regularly about the West’s lecturing over democratic backsliding in India. All of which should mean that US President Donald Trump’s return to power ought to be a moment of jubilation for Modi and his foreign policy team. After all, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has seemingly upended decades of American strategy by aruging not only that the world is now multipolar, but that his administration actually prefers this. But is that a good thing for India?
Here is what Rubio said (and note which country isn’t named):
“It’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power. That was not – that was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia, and then you have rogue states like Iran and North Korea you have to deal with.”
There are two fears that emerge from the US embracing a framework that India has long demanded.
The first is about where the scales fall on the rhetoric vs action balance, especially with regard to India’s multi-alignment. Modi’s team may have been irritated by Biden era lecturing, but the framework of the ‘democracies vs autocracies’ set-up meant the US accounting for New Delhi’s rise and the potential for it to say no to DC on occasion. It was always interesting how Jaishankar’s ‘savage’ barbs were most pointedly used against India’s potential partners in the West, rather than New Delhi’s more proximate adversaries, in part because Western liberal rhetoric allowed space for a post-colonial state to push back in this manner.
As Rajesh Rajagopalan explained to me in 2023, “the US, given its power, can afford to be more forgiving of its partners. Whether it is France, during the Cold War period, or Germany, Turkey or Israel – all of these are countries that have done things that the US had disagreed with, but it has been able to ignore because it can afford to do that. In India’s case, Ashley Tellis’ piece indicates concerns [from DC]…. Our value to the US is being partly exaggerated, because the US is very forgiving and good at doing alliance management, not standing on ceremony, not taking offence at various things and so on. But we tend to think that their solicitousness is because of our indispensability.”
If the US is dropping that idea that it is the singular pole and defender of the ‘rules-based order’, will it continue to be as forgiving if, say, India continues to buy oil1 and missile defence systems from Russia and fighter jets from France?
To wit, here was Trump following the meeting with Modi:
“Starting this year, we’ll be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We’re also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters…
As a signal of good faith, Prime Minister Modi recently announced the reductions to India’s unfair, very strong tariffs that limit U.S. access into the Indian market very strongly. And really, it’s big problem, I must say. India imposes a 30 to 40 to 60 and even 70 percent tariff on so many of the goods and, in some cases, far more than that. As an example, a 70 percent tariff on U.S. cars going into India, which makes it pretty much impossible to sell those cars.
Today, the U.S. trade deficit with India is almost $100 billion… and we can make up the difference very easily with the deficit with the sale of oil and gas and LNG, of which we have more than anybody in the world.
The prime minister and I also reached an important agreement on energy that will restore the United States as a leading supplier of oil and gas to India. It will be, hopefully, their number-one supplier in the groundbreaking development for U.S. nuclear industry. India is also reforming its laws to welcome U.S. nuclear technology, which is at the highest level, into the Indian market. This will bring safe, clean, and affordable electricity to millions of Indians and tens of billions of dollars to the U.S.-civilian nuclear industry in India.”
In other words, will the US embrace of a multipolar world – taking place before India’s geo-economic heft is sufficient for it to assert itself as a global, or even Asian, pole – actually end up harming India’s multi-alignment strategy? Will India receive net benefits from a tighter American embrace, even a more extractive one, or will it hand over too much of its autonomy to DC?
Note, for example, that while the F-35 proposal from the US suggests DC is willing to share its most complex technology with India (even if it has been disparaged by Trump advisor Elon Musk), it may also come with serious consequences. As one official told the Times of India, “India will inexorably be drawn into the US’s sphere of influence with the F-35 acquisition, impinging on its strategic autonomy. Why do you think successive Indian govts over the years have acquired Russian, French and other fighters but never American ones?”
Similarly, after years of retreating from trade deals, Trump’s moves – rather than any domestic policy rethink – have prompted India to come back to the trade deal table, including the lowering of tarrifs and beginning of negotiations with the UK (where trade talks have just been relaunched), EU and a deadline for a US-India trade deal later this year. And for all the ‘Modi magic’ in DC claims, reciprocal tarrifs remain on the table, as well as a skepticism for ‘make in India’ riders in return for market access.
This is what Trump and Elon Musk put it in an interview after the Modi visit:
THE PRESIDENT: “Every country in the world takes advantage of us, and they do it with tariffs. They makes — make it — it’s impossible for him [Musk] to sell a car, practically, in, as an example, India. I don’t know if that’s true or not, but I think —
MR. MUSK: The tariffs are like 100 percent import duty.
THE PRESIDENT: The tariffs are so high —
MR. MUSK: Yeah.
THE PRESIDENT: — they don’t want to — now, if he built the factory in India, that’s okay, but that’s unfair to us. It’s very unfair.
And I said, “You know what we do?” I told Prime Minister Modi yesterday — he was here. I said, “Here’s what you do. We’re going to do — be very fair with you.” They charge the highest tariffs in the world, just about.
Q: 36 percent?
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, much — much higher.
MR. MUSK: It’s 100 percent on — auto imports are 100 percent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, that’s peanuts. So, much higher. And — and others too. I said, “Here’s what we’re going to do: reciprocal. Whatever you charge, I’m charging.” He goes, “No, no, I don’t like that.” “No, no, whatever you charge, I’m going to charge.” I’m doing that with every country.
MR. MUSK: It seems fair.”
(No surprise that India suddenly seems to have opened up as a market for Musk’s Tesla).
The other fear that has emerged is a grander one. Trump’s is seen seeking to carve up spheres of influence, allowing America to dominate the Western hemisphere (as Project 2025 put it), and perhaps leaving Europe to Vladimir Putin. What happens if that leads to a ‘big, beautiful deal’ with Beijing over Asia?
As C Raja Mohan writes,
“Could Trump consider a grand bargain with China in Asia, much in the manner he is attempting one with Russia in Europe? India is less vulnerable than Japan, South Korea, and, most obviously, Taiwan to a big shift in U.S. policy on China, but New Delhi’s economic and security challenges would certainly become bigger. When an Indian reporter sought to bait Trump into talking tough on China during the joint press conference with Modi, he refused. Instead, he reaffirmed his desire to get along well with Xi. Trump pointed to India’s border conflict with China, offering to help diffuse it if asked.”
India later had to turn down Trump’s offer to mediate between Beijing and New Delhi, but the US president’s consistent indications that he is willing to work with China are certainly inspiring some concern, even if a Sino-American deal seems unlikely and Modi doesn’t have very many options in the short-run. But Ukraine’s fate is inspiring commentary about what it means to be associated with a great power and then cast aside, and whether India has the werewithal to continue pursuing multi-alignment.
Speaking of which,
“European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the 27-nation bloc’s political leadership will visit India to enhance trade, economic security and defence cooperation at a time of geopolitical turmoil in Europe caused by US President Donald Trump’s policies.
The trip by Von der Leyen and the European Union (EU) College of Commissioners, or political leaders of the 27 member states, is being described as unprecedented as it is rare for the entire leadership to jointly visit any foreign country. This is also one of the first foreign visits by the European Commission elected last year.
Read also:
Anunita Chandrasekhar: “Despite the warm rhetoric, the EU-India relationship is currently much thinner than it could be.”
Asfandyar Mir, Daniel Markey, Vikram J. Singh and Sameer P. Lalwani on the Modi visit.
Ravi Dutta Mishra: What would a trade deal with the US mean for India?
Shreyas Shende spoke to Daniel Markey and Elizabeth Threlkeld on Trump 2.0 and the Indian subcontinent.
10 Links
Scroll.in’s Ayush Tiwari flew to Cambodia to report on ‘scam compounds’ allegedly run by Chinese gangs that lure Indians using job schemes that turn out to be, effectively, ‘cyber slavery’.
Michael Acton and John Reed on Apple’s “quiet pivot to India.”
Niranjan Rajadhyaksha speaks to
about India’s economic path forward:“India has consciously chosen to stay out of regional trade deals such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). I think it is time to reconsider some of these decisions. Many other FTA negotiations have not progressed as initially expected. One strategic decision that the Indian government needs to make is whether it wants to connect more with the trade in intermediate goods that is dominant in Asia or to geographies of final demand such as the US and Europe.
The geopolitical winds are aligned well for India, so this would be the wrong time to become more protectionist. There is also the broader political economy question about why large Indian conglomerates tend to invest in non-tradable sectors such as telecom, finance, retail and infrastructure, rather than in the tradable sectors such as manufacturing.”
Nirupama Subramanian: “Days before the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hammad Thani, arrived in India to a warm welcome from Prime Minister Narendra Modi, an Adani company and a Qatar company signed a joint venture that increases Gautam Adani’s footprint in maritime operations in the Gulf region.”
M Rajshekhar has questions about the Great Nicobar Project: The proposed container port lacks commercial logic, its naval merits are unclear—so why is this project being pushed through at any cost? (See also Vaishnavi Rathore’s report from last year).
Surajkumar Thube reviews Janaki Bakhle’s Savarkar: The Making of Hindutva:
“If Savarkar saw Hindutva as history, and his poetic expressions as the means to imagine a long history of the idea of India, it was necessary for his zeal to construct this memory of a universal Hindu to be memorialised. Bakhle provides a meaningful exploration of the Marathi landscape of different types of what she calls "Savarkar memorialization."
In this hitherto uncharted territory, she begins by exploring his biography, a select sampling of authorised biographies and concludes by a surfeit of hagiographies which she calls "darshana-dakshina," meaning ‘witness-homage’ literature…
Bakhle carefully peels Savarkar’s popularity over the years by exploring the cultivation of multiple celebratory afterlives of his myth, especially in Maharashtra. Almost akin to a collective, devotional exercise, numerous amateur historians, senior writers, and nameless and faceless people have preserved and propagated Savarkar’s image as an anti-colonial, progressive hero. Savarkar’s haughty projection of himself as an ace historian and an unparalleled pedagogue gets complimented by this obsequious nature of preserving the myth of Savarkar.”
Claude Arpi: Was China’s mega dam announcement a trial balloon?
“A top Indian fund manager’s warning on market excesses has gotten under everyone’s skin, fund managers and investors alike. It’s a sign that a stocks winter may be coming that will test, among many other things, their faith in each other. This is the “most dangerous year from a 10-year point of view,” Sankaran Naren, chief investment officer at ICICI Prudential AMC, the nation’s second-biggest money manager, said in a now-viral speech at an industry event last week.”
Miscellany
Recall the history of Trump 1.0 and India ending its reliance on Iran for oil. On Iran, again, India faces some serious complications from Trump 2.0.