Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s big state visit to the US, with all the attendant announcements, drama and attention, and then to Egypt came just as I set out on summer travels to India (with an 18-month-old in tow) meaning I won’t be writing something longer on the visit or its deliverables right now, but I couldn’t help myself from popping up to at least send out some links for those who want to catch up or better interpret the developments.
John Reed & Demetri Sevastopulo have a good wrap:
“We are allies in all but name,” says [Shivshankar] Menon, the former Indian official. “The US is not going to come and fight for every inch of Indian territory, but we can do everything allies do short of defending each other."
C Raja Mohan gives credit to Xi Jinping for supercharging the Indo-US relationship: “For the first time since the Second World War, the US-India security partnership now becomes a new and significant variable in Asian geopolitics.”
Three podcasts to put the India-US relationship in context:
*Ashley Tellis speaks to Milan Vaishnav about his much-discussed piece titled the US’ bad bet on India.
*Arzan Tarapore speaks, also to Milan Vaishnav, about his response: ‘America’s best bet in the Indo-Pacific.’
*Raji Pillai talks to Joe Wallen and Tushar Shetty about the fundamentals of the relationship and where it may be going.In the run-up to the visit, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar gave an hour-long interview to the Economist, with lots to dig into across the conversation, like this excerpt on the India-Russia calculation:
”I would not reduce the issue just to India’s military dependence on Russia. Again it’s a far more complex subject than that. For us, there are three big Eurasian powers, Russia, China, and India. That has its own dynamics. This is not transactional. This is geopolitical. When you say geopolitical, we are talking of the outcomes that happen when major powers get closer or move away from each other, or depending on the quality of their co-operation. So a lot in Eurasia will depend on the dynamics of these three powers. It’s been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy, which still remains valid, that maintaining a strong relationship and a good relationship with Russia is essential. The geopolitical logic indicates that. So I don’t want to dumb this down to military dependence. It’s one important part. But there is that larger geopolitical outlook or calculation on our side. I’m giving you an Indian perspective, we would like to have multiple choices. And obviously try to make the best of it. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that. Every country would like to do that. Some may be constrained by other obligations, some may not. So to me this is bigger than just saying the Indians have this big military arsenal that they inherited from the past. I also look ahead, I make my calculations, I make my strategy. I look at you know, what are the costs and benefits of various relationships? And the real challenge of diplomacy is how do you reconcile that with contradictory pulls and pushes?Suhasini Haidar points out the unique framework that the US has been willing to build with India: ”For India, the rapidly rising arc of ties has been seen in terms of shrugging off what Mr. Modi in 2016 called the “hesitations of history” and of renouncing the government’s Cold War muscle-memory in Indian foreign policy towards the U.S. The more important arc, however, is the shift in the U.S.’s belief in “American exceptionalism”, to a more pragmatic era of “American exception-ism for India”. In other words, it is the U.S.’s decision to make a series of exceptions specifically for India in the first quarter of this century that has been responsible for the big surges in a relationship billed as the most “defining partnership of the century” by Mr. Obama (2009), and Mr. Biden (2023).”
Rajesh Rajagopalan – who we interviewed on Indo-US relations, China, and multipolarity a few weeks ago – insists that this is a liability:
“Through much of the last two decades, it is difficult not to see this relationship as something in which most of the burden of pushing forward has been borne by Washington. That continues. It again appears, looking at the various sets of agreements signed in this visit, that New Delhi has not invested much beyond a road show. Almost all agreements are references to various elements that the US provides. There is only one area, at least in a cursory first reading, that appears to be an effort made on the Indian side: ISRO joining the NASA Artemis Accords, which is useful but still marginal. Another, possibly, is underwater domain awareness, which appears to be the first time this has been mentioned. This is an extension of maritime domain awareness but a critical one. The rest are largely warmed over from previous agreements.”Gokul Sahni, however, argues that it’s mistaken to see this as just an American altruistic bet on India.
A few more bits and bobs out of the actual agreement: The full text of Modi’s speech to a joint sitting of Congress. More details about the jets, and why India should still build its own. A highlights and resources thread from Dhruva Jaishankar. India in the Artemis Accords. India annoyed by drone discourse. Background on the Micron chip announcement. Important Trade Representative news. And more on Indus-X.
In a CNN interview that came out as the visit was in progress, former President Barack Obama brought up Modi’s poor record in shielding India’s Muslim minority from majoritarianism, and then went on to more problematically speak of the danger of India “pulling apart.” Some saw this as a way of appeasing the wing of the Democratic party that is uncomfortable with US President Joe Biden’s all-out embrace of Modi and India. Of course, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma promptly proved the first part of the comment right by using it to make a communal dogwhistle. The one question Modi took at the ‘press conference’ with Biden during the visit also focused on this subject, with the White House later having to condemn right-wing Indian harassment of the Wall Street Journal reporter who posed the query.
The visit also brought out commentary on how the US was willing to overlook the democratic backsliding that has taken place under Modi, even as others echoed Barkha Dutt’s piece from earlier this year saying that the US must not lecture India on democracy. We discussed this question – who gets to criticise India – last month:
Finally, the Egypt visit. Navdeep Suri argues that for all the big leaps this year, India should “be clear-eyed that the trajectory of our ties with Egypt will be a lot less linear than the dramatic transformation that we have seen with UAE and Saudi Arabia. Like India, Egypt is replete with contradictions. It is ancient and modern, authoritarian and argumentative, egotistic and naïve — all at the same time. As we embark on this journey, we will have to be prepared for the long haul.” See also pieces by Kabir Taneja and Ken Moriyasu.
Thanks for reading India Inside Out. If I’ve missed any useful links on the visit, please do drop them in the comments below.
About second point
It is not only China , but US lost influence in this region bit by bit under Biden which was also seen as a diplomatic nightmare. Sudden removal of forces , Pakistan sitting in lap of China these factors too contributed to US and India to align their vision to have dominance in indo Pacific region.
About Obama , he is an ex pres his words and concerns means nothing. He was there to just tell the world how balanced the party is.
None of them care , it was only to appease the Nehruvian cult.
Cannot thank you enough for all the cumulative one-point solution you have given to this mammoth of a visit.